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I.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case.

Appellant appealed a decision from the district court dismissing a petition for judicial
review seeking to set aside an order of the Idaho State Board of Pharmacy (“Board”) that denied
an untimely request for attorney’s fees and costs. In the underlying case before the Board,
Appellant was awarded attorney’s fees and costs subject to a 14-day request deadline. Appellant
submitted a request for fees and costs over 6 months past the 14-day deadline. Pursuant to IDAPA
04.11.01.741.02 (“Rule 741”), the Board has the discretion to grant an untimely request for good
cause shown. Appellant failed to show good cause for the extreme delay, and the Board denied
the request. Though Appellant argues that a consideration of prejudice is required under the Rule
741 good cause analysis, the plain language of the rule makes no such requirement. Appellant
seeks to insert an additional requirement that does not appear in the plain language of Rule 741.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts.

In the underlying case, the Board entered a Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final
Order on May 6, 2019 (“underlying order”), entitling Appellant to the recovery of reasonable
attorney’s fees and defense costs. Appeal Exs. at 12-17. The underlying order stated: “[Appellant]
is entitled to recover her reasonable attorney’s fees and defense costs necessarily and actually
incurred in this matter, which [Appellant] may apply for in accordance with Rule 741 of the Idaho
Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General (IDAPA 04.11.01.741).” Id. at 17.
The underlying order was served to Appellant on May 7, 2019. Id. at 18. Appellant filed a request
for attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $6,761.25 on December 11, 2019—over 6 months
past the 14-day deadline found in Rule 741.02. See id. at 19-23. The request noted the hourly rate
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and invoice for legal services for Appellant’s counsel, Ms. Buentgen, but did not address the
untimely filing or delay. Id.
Idaho State Board of Pharmacy staff (“Board Staff”) filed an objection to the request for
attorney’s fees and costs on December 23, 2019, stating that Appellant’s request was untimely
pursuant to Rule 741. Id. at 32-35. The Board scheduled a hearing and served a Notice of Hearing
on February 11, 2020, id. at 24-27, and an Amended Notice of Hearing on April 1, 2020, id. at 2831. On March 30, 2020, Appellant filed a second declaration in support of her request for
attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 36-40. Therein, Appellant argued that Rule 741.02.a required that
the agency allow “no fewer than fourteen (14) days” to file the request.1 Id. at 37 ¶ 5 (emphasis
omitted). Appellant also provided information about counsel’s health history from 2006 to 2017,
and generally stated that Ms. Buentgen suffers from fatigue. Id. at 37-39 ¶¶ 7-8. Appellant
admitted that the request was filed more than 14 days after the service date of the underlying order.
Id. at 37 ¶ 6.
Board Staff filed a second response and declaration on April 3, 2019. Id. at 41-51. The
second response stated that there was no evidence of specific incidents that show good cause
between May 7, 2019 and May 22, 2019,2 or the date Appellant filed the request on December 11,
2019. Id. at 44. Appellant filed a response and third declaration in support of the request for
attorney’s fees and costs on April 8, 2019. Id. at 52-68. In the third declaration, Appellant’s
attorney stated: “I admit I did not calendar the fourteen (14) day deadline currently at issue in this
matter; possibly this was a mistake on my part.” Id. at 64 ¶ 3. The declaration went on to state:
On page 7 of the [underlying order] the Notice of Procedural Rights (“Notice”) is
found. I apparently wrongfully focused on these dates, specifically the fourteen
(14) days for reconsideration of the Final Order and the twenty-eight (28) days to
1

The plain language of Rule 741 states that 14 days is the deadline, rather than the minimum.
IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02.
2
May 22, 2019 is the fourteenth day after date of service of the underlying order.
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appeal the Final Order. Given the above language I was waiting until after these
dates had passed before submitting my bill. I did not anticipate nor thought there
would be an issue concerning the payment of my attorney fees if the bill was
presented more than fourteen (14) days after the Final Order. Obviously, that was
a judgment error on my part.
Id. (citation omitted). It also stated that Ms. Buentgen is a solo practitioner and did not have the
resources to hire staff to assist with the preparation of the request. Id. ¶ 4. The third declaration
provided general information about Ms. Buentgen’s health, but did not provide specific
information about the timeframe between May 7, 2019 and the expiration of the 14-day deadline
on May 22, 2019, or between May 7, 2019 and the date Appellant filed her request on December
11, 2019. See id. at 63-66.
The hearing was held on April 9, 2020—at which Board Staff’s counsel and Ms. Buentgen
provided legal argument, and Ms. Buentgen provided additional testimony. See id. at 28, 77-78
(Tr. 11:4-15:1), 78-81 (Tr. 17:14-26:21), 81 (Tr. 28:3-29:11). Ms. Buentgen stated: “And I do
admit that I didn’t look at the 14 days, because first off the order is silent so then it reverts back to
that.” Exs. at 80 (Tr. 23:12-14). Ms. Buentgen continued:
I had other work that I was doing during that time period. I am a sole practitioner.
I don’t have any employees. Additionally, this type of declaration is based on
personal information and belief, so it would require me to prepare it; that I do suffer
from extreme fatigue; and that I have to prioritize. And I didn’t think that this was
going to be an issue, quite frankly.
Id. at 80 (Tr. 23:22-24:4). Ms. Buentgen also stated: “the notice that I focused on was . . . the time
period to reconsider and the time for appeal. I didn’t notice the 14 days. And when you read the
rules, it reverts back to [the 14 days] if there’s nothing stated in the order.” Id. at 81 (Tr. 28:2129:1). The Board requested clarification on the legal standard from its Board counsel. Id. at 81
(Tr. 27:5-9). Board counsel stated that the “Board would consider the totality of the circumstances
for the time period . . . from the final order to when [the request] was made . . . whether there was
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good cause to explain the delay[,] . . . not whether the other party suffered prejudice.” Id. at 82
(Tr. 30:3-12).
The Board voted to deny the untimely request for attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 82 (Tr.
32:2-33:5). In the Order Denying Untimely Request for Attorney’s Fees (“Order”), the Board
identified that Ms. Buentgen failed to identify specific events between May 2019 and December
2019 that prevented counsel from filing a request or seeking an extension of time. See id. at 70.
The Board Order also identified that Ms. Buentgen “provided information at the hearing that she
is a solo practitioner without assistants, she had failed to read the rule property and calendar the
date, and she believed that the request would be granted when she did make the request.” Id. at 70
¶ 12. The Board served the Order on May 1, 2020.3 Id. at 69-73.
Appellant filed a Petition for Judicial Review with the district court on May 27, 2020. R.
at 86-100. After briefing was submitted by both parties, a hearing was held on December 8, 2020.
R. at 18. The district court entered an order dismissing the petition for judicial review with
prejudice on January 13, 2021. R. at 18-24. The court held that while Appellant argues that the
Board was required to show prejudice, “[prejudice] is not required by the plain language of the
rules nor the case law on which [Appellant] relies.” R. at 21. The court further stated that
“[Appellant] has not pointed to any language in the rules requiring the opposing party show
prejudice, because there is none.” R. at 21-22.
Appellant filed a notice of appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court on February 24, 2021. R. at
4-6.

3

The Order was signed by the Board Chair on April 26, 2020, and mailed to Appellant on April
28, 2020. The Order was also emailed to Appellant on May 7, 2020. For purposes of this
proceeding, the Board will accept Appellant’s date of service for the Order of May 1, 2020. See
R. at 66.
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

The Board wishes to restate the issues on appeals as follows:
1.

Whether there is substantial and competent evidence in the record to support the
Board’s denial of the untimely request for attorney’s fees and costs.

2.

Whether Appellant has failed to meet her burden to show that the Board’s denial of
the untimely request for attorney’s fees and costs was arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion.

3.

Whether the Board correctly determined that good cause did not exist to support
the untimely request, and was not required to make a finding of prejudice.

4.

Whether Appellant has failed to meet her burden to show that the Board’s Order
prejudiced Appellant’s substantial rights.
III.

A.

ARGUMENT

Standard of Review.

“Where a district court acts in an appellate capacity under the Administrative Procedures
[sic] Act, on further appeal from the district court’s determination, [the Idaho Supreme Court]
review[s] the agency record independently of the district court’s decision.” St. Joseph Reg'l Med.
Ctr. v. Nez Perce Cty. Comm’rs, 134 Idaho 486, 488, 5 P.3d 466, 468 (2000) (citations omitted).
A court exercises free review over an agency’s conclusions of law. See Uhl v. Ballard Med. Prods.,
Inc., 138 Idaho 653, 657, 67 P.3d 1265, 1269 (2003). The reviewing court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the decision maker on questions of fact. Idaho County v. Idaho Dep't of
Health & Welfare, 128 Idaho 846, 848, 920 P.2d 62, 64 (1996) (citation omitted); see also Idaho
Code § 67-5279(1).
A reviewing court:
[S]hall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the agency’s
findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
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(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) (emphasis added). A petitioner challenging an agency’s decision bears
the burden of establishing that the decision violates one of the grounds specified in Idaho Code
section 67-5279(3). See Wheeler v. Idaho Dep’t of Health & Welfare, 147 Idaho 257, 260, 207
P.3d 988, 991 (2009) (citation omitted). “Even if one of these conditions is met, this Court will
still affirm the agency action ‘unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.’” A
& B Irrigation Dist. v. Idaho Dep’t. of Water Res., 153 Idaho 500, 506, 284 P.3d 225, 231 (2012)
(first quoting Idaho Code § 67–5279(4), and then citing Barron v. Idaho Dep’t of Water Res., 135
Idaho 414, 417, 18 P.3d 219, 222 (2001)).
A reviewing court “defers to the agency’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous,” and “the agency’s factual determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even
when there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are supported
by substantial competent evidence in the record.” Id. at 505-06, 284 P.3d at 230-31 (citation
omitted). Substantial evidence is “relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to
support a conclusion.” Pearl v. Bd. of Prof’l Discipline of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 137 Idaho 107,
112, 44 P.3d 1162, 1167 (2002) (citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla
of proof, but less than a preponderance.” Id. The substantial evidence standard does not permit a
reviewing court to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. See Idaho Code § 67-5279(1).
“A strong presumption of validity favors an agency’s actions.” Warner v. Idaho Trans. Dep’t, 160
Idaho 732, 734, 378 P.3d 1031, 1033 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Idaho State Bd. of Real Estate
Appraisers, 157 Idaho 496, 501, 337 P.3d 655, 660 (2014)).
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B.

The Board applied the correct standard when it denied the untimely request
for fees because the plain language of Rule 741 requires only a good cause
analysis, not a separate consideration of prejudice.

The Board entered the underlying order on May 6, 2019. Appeal Exs. at 12-18. The
underlying order entitled Appellant to the recovery of reasonable attorney’s fees and defense costs
“necessarily and actually incurred in this matter[.]” Id. at 17. The underlying order stated that
Appellant “may apply for [the attorney’s fees] in accordance with Rule 741 of the Idaho Rules of
Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General (IDAPA 04.11.01.741).” Id.
Rule 741.02.a through .d states:
Time for Filing for Costs and/or Fees Awarded in Final Order or
Preliminary Order. Unless otherwise provided by statute or rule of the agency:
a.
Minimum time for filing. When a final order or a preliminary
order of the agency awards costs and/ or fees to a party or to the agency
itself, the agency must allow no fewer than fourteen (14) days from the
service date of the final order or the preliminary order for the party to whom
costs and/or fees were awarded or for the agency to file necessary papers
(e.g., a memorandum of costs, affidavits, exhibits, etc.) quantifying and
otherwise supporting costs or fees, or both, that will be claimed or a motion
to extend the time to file for costs and fees.
b.
Longer time allowed. The final order or preliminary order of
the agency may extend the time to file papers for costs and/or fees beyond
fourteen (14) days after the service date of the final order or preliminary
order.
c.
When time not set forth. If statute, rules of the agency, and
the final order or preliminary order of the agency are silent on the time for
filing for costs and/or fees the deadline for filing for costs and/or fees
and/or for moving for an extension of the time to file for costs and fees
is fourteen (14) days from the service date of the final order or preliminary
order.
d.
Untimely filing. The agency may exercise its discretion to
consider and grant an untimely filing for costs and/or fees for good
cause shown.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, if the order is silent as to the deadline for filing for fees and costs, as it
was here, (see Appeal Exs. at 12-18), then the deadline shall be 14 days from the service date.
RESPONDENT’S BRIEF – 7

IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02.a-.d. Because Appellant was served with the underlying order on May 7,
2019, Appeal Exs. at 18, the 14-day deadline to file for attorney’s fees and costs was May 22,
2019. However, Appellant filed the request over six months later, on December 11, 2019. Id. at
19-23. Accordingly, the request for attorney’s fees and costs was untimely.
Rule 741.02.d also provides that: “The agency may exercise its discretion to consider and
grant an untimely filing for costs and/or fees for good cause shown.” (Emphasis added.) By its
terms, Rule 741.02.d does not require an analysis of prejudice to the parties. The only standard
included in Rule 741.02.d is a showing of good cause. The Board correctly applied this standard
in its Order. Appeal Exs. at 71 (stating “the Board does not find that good cause existed to warrant
a delay of more than six months”).
Appellant questions whether Rule 741 applies to Idaho Code section 12-117(5) as the text
of Rule 741 was amended in 2011 and section 12-117(5) was amended in 2018. Appellant’s Br.
at 15. Rule 741.01 addresses this assertion: “This rule provides procedures for considering
requests for costs and/or fees (including attorneys’ fees) when an agency has authority to award
costs and/or fees under other provisions of law. This rule is not a source of authority for awarding
costs and/or fees.” As the rule addresses other sources of authority for fees and costs, it governs
the procedures for filing for fees and costs awarded under any authority, including section 12117(5).
Appellant also argues that a separate analysis of prejudice is required within the good cause
analysis; however, this assertion is not supported by the language of the rule or by case law. In
Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 345, 941 P.2d 314, 317 (1997), the Court analyzed Idaho
Rules of Civil Procedure (“I.R.C.P.”) 4(a)(2) and 36(b). I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) (1997) stated:
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within six
(6) months after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such
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service was required cannot show good cause why such service was not made
within that period, the action shall be dismissed as to that defendant without
prejudice upon the court’s own initiative with 14 days (sic) notice to such party or
upon motion.
(Emphasis added.) I.R.C.P. 36(b) (1997) stated:
Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on
motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. . . . [T]he court may
permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of the merits of the action
will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to
satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice that party in
maintaining an action or defense on the merits.
(Emphasis added.) The plain language of I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) (1997) required a mandatory dismissal
upon a failure to show good cause, while the plain language of I.R.C.P. 36(b) (1997) provided for
a discretionary allowance to withdraw upon an analysis of prejudice.
In Sammis, the Court indicates that good cause and prejudice analyses are not
interchangeable. Sammis, 130 Idaho at 352, 941 P.2d at 324 (holding that the lower court’s
application of a good cause analysis when I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) required a two-prong determination
including a consideration of prejudice was not the correct legal standard, and vacating the district
court’s order).

The Court wrote that “[t]he ‘good cause’ language, while relevant to a

determination of whether to dismiss a claim for violation of Rule 4(a)(2), does not appear in Rule
36(b).” Id. Thus, good cause and prejudice are separate analyses with different considerations.
Applying this principle to the current case, the plain language of Rule 741 provides the
Board with the discretion to allow an untimely request for fees and costs upon a showing of good
cause. There exists no mention of a prejudice analysis under Rule 741, so it should not be applied.
Appellant misstates the holding of Sammis to differentiate between the mandatory nature
of I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2) and the discretionary nature of I.R.C.P. 36(b), Appellant’s Br. at 13, rather than
to require application of plain language. Appellant argues that the Court held that all discretionary
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rules must consider prejudice to the parties. Appellant’s Br. at 13, 16. Nowhere in the Sammis
case is that holding made. The Court considered the binding nature of “shall” rules; however, this
analysis falls under the section analyzing the Sammis’ pro se status and whether their pro se status
excused their lack of compliance with the rules. Sammis, 130 Idaho at 347, 941 P.2d at 319. The
Court also held the lower court abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard. Id. at
352, 941 P.2d at 324 (holding that application of a good cause analysis where the plain language
of the rule required a prejudice analysis was improper). The Court, however, does not mandate a
widespread application of a prejudice analysis to other discretionary rules with a different analysis.
Appellant cites to two other cases to support the assertion that a consideration of prejudice
is required under a good cause analysis. See Appellant’s Br. at 11. In Ada County Highway
District by and through Fairbanks v. Acarrequi, 105 Idaho 873, 874, 673 P.2d 1067, 1068 (1983),
overruled on other grounds by State, Department of Transportation v. Grathol, 158 Idaho 38, 343
P.3d 480 (2015), the Idaho Supreme Court considered I.R.C.P. 54(d)(5) (1983), which stated,
“[s]uch memorandum of costs may not be filed later than 10 days after entry of judgment.” The
Court identified that the time periods under I.R.C.P. 54 may be enlarged at the discretion of the
trial court and that the record disclosed no harm or prejudice resulting to allowing amendment of
the memorandum of costs. Acarrequi, at 875, 673 P.2d at 1069. However, I.R.C.P. 54 has no
requirement of a showing of good cause, whereas Rule 741 does. Appellant also cites to Bradley
v. Washington Group International, 141 Idaho 655, 657-58, 115 P.3d 746, 748-49 (2005), where
the Court stated that it was an abuse of discretion for the Idaho Industrial Commission to deny a
timely request of fees for insufficient documentation. That case involved a timely request for fees,
whereas this case involves an untimely request for fees over which the Board had discretion to
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grant upon a showing of good cause. Neither case stands for the assertion that a consideration of
prejudice is required under a good cause analysis.
Thus, the question of whether a party has been prejudiced by the delay of an untimely filing
is irrelevant to the question of whether there is good cause for missing a deadline. The Board
applied the correct standard in its Order.
C.

The Order was supported by substantial evidence on the record.

The lower court correctly identified that the Board’s decision was supported by substantial
and competent evidence. Rule 741 provides that: “The agency may exercise its discretion to
consider and grant an untimely filing for costs and/or fees for good cause shown.” IDAPA
04.11.01.741.02.d (emphasis added). As such, the burden is on Appellant to show evidence of
good cause to explain the untimely filing.

“When reviewing a lower court or agency’s

discretionary decision, this Court must conduct a three-part inquiry to determine whether the lower
court abused its discretion.” Magee v. Thompson Creek Min. Co., 152 Idaho 196, 200, 268 P.3d
464, 468 (2012). “A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue
as discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards,
and (3) reaches the decision through an exercise of reason.” Id. (quoting West Wood Invs., Inc. v.
Acord, 141 Idaho 75, 82, 106 P.3d 401, 408 (2005)).
A petitioner challenging an agency’s decision bears the burden of establishing that the
decision violates one of the grounds specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3). Wheeler, 147
Idaho at 260, 207 P.3d at 991. Here, Appellant admitted that the filing was untimely, Appeal Exs.
at 37, and submitted the following information to meet the burden to show that good cause existed:


Appellant argued that Rule 741.02.a required that the agency allow “no fewer than
fourteen (14) days” to file the request. Appeal Exs. at 37 ¶ 5 (emphasis omitted).



Information about Ms. Buentgen’s health from 2006 to 2017. Id. at 37-39 ¶¶ 8-9.
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General statements that Ms. Buentgen suffers from fatigue. Id.



“On page 7 of the [underlying order] the Notice of Procedural Rights (“Notice”) is
found. I apparently wrongfully focused on these dates, specifically the fourteen
(14) days for reconsideration of the Final Order and the twenty-eight (28) days to
appeal the Final Order. Given the above language I was waiting until after these
dates had passed before submitting my bill.” Id. at 64 ¶ 3.



“And I do admit that I didn’t look at the 14 days, because first off the order is silent,
so then it reverts back to that.” Id. at 80 (Tr. 23:12-14).



“[T]he notice that I focused on was . . . the time period to reconsider and the time
for appeal. I didn’t notice the 14 days. And when you read the rules, it reverts back
to it if there’s nothing stated in the order.” Id. at 81 (Tr. 28:22-29:1).



“I admit I did not calendar the fourteen (14) day deadline currently at issue in this
matter; possibly this was a mistake on my part.” Id. at 64 ¶ 3.



“I did not anticipate nor thought there would be an issue concerning the payment
of my attorney fees if the bill was presented more than fourteen (14) days after the
Final Order. Obviously, that was a judgment error on my part.” Id.



“I had other work that I was doing during that time period.” Id. at 80 (Tr. 23:2223).



“I am a sole practitioner.” Id. at 80 (Tr. 23:23-24).



“I don’t have any employees. Additionally, this type of declaration is based on
personal information and belief, so it would require me to prepare it[.]” Id. at 80
(Tr. 23:24-24:2).



“I do suffer from extreme fatigue; and that I have to prioritize.” Id. at 80 (Tr. 24:23).



“And I didn’t think that this was going to be an issue, quite frankly.” Id. at 80 (Tr.
24:3-4).

In sum, Appellant’s causes for the delay include failure to read the applicable rule, failure to
calendar the date, counsel’s general fatigue related to previous health history outside of the relevant
time period, counsel’s status as a solo practitioner without assistants, and a belief that fees and
costs would be awarded regardless of an applicable deadline. Id. at 37-39 ¶¶ 8-9, 64 ¶ 3-4, 80 (Tr.
23:12-13, 23:22-24:4). Any additional information provided to the district court or this Court by
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Appellant was not presented to the Board and should be excluded from consideration. See St.
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Elmore County, 158 Idaho 648, 650, 350 P.3d 1025, 1027 (2015)
(quoting Shobe v. Ada Cty., Bd. of Comm’rs, 130 Idaho 580, 583, 944 P.2d 715, 718 (1997))
(“Judicial review of an administrative order is limited to the record.”).
In examining other procedural rules requiring good cause to warrant an untimely filing, the
Idaho Supreme Court has stated that a determination of good cause is “based upon the facts and
circumstances” following the date that the time begins to run. Harrison v. Bd. of Prof’l Discipline
of Idaho State Bd. of Med., 145 Idaho 179, 183, 177 P.3d 393, 397 (2008) (citation omitted).
Though Appellant cites to Ms. Buentgen’s health history from 2006 to 2017, there was no specific
information before the Board relating to the relevant time period between May 2019 and December
2019. “Courts look to factors outside of the plaintiff’s control including sudden illness, natural
catastrophe, or evasion of service of process.” Id. (citing Martin v. Hoblit, 133 Idaho 372, 377,
987 P.2d 284, 289 (1999)). Appellant did not identify any specific facts or circumstances of this
nature during the relevant time.
Moreover, ignorance of procedural requirements does not constitute good cause. Sammis,
130 Idaho at 347, 941 P.2d at 319. In Sammis, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that a pro se
litigant’s failure to be aware of the requirements of procedural rules does not constitute good cause
and does not excuse their failure to comply with the time limitations. Id. (citations omitted). The
Idaho Supreme Court later discussed Sammis and held, “[i]f ignorance of the requirements of
procedural rules does not excuse a pro se litigant’s failure to comply with Rule 4(a)(2) [in Sammis],
it certainly does not excuse the failure of a party represented by counsel to do so.” Taylor v.
Chamberlain, 154 Idaho 695, 700, 302 P.3d 35, 40 (2013). Accordingly, the failure to read or
understand Rule 741 and calendar the date does not show good cause.
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Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Medrano v. Neibaur, 136 Idaho 767, 76869, 40 P.3d 125, 126-27 (2005), that the Industrial Commission abused its discretion when it
awarded attorney fees to a party that submitted the request nearly six months after the deadline.
In that case, the requesting party missed the deadline with no explanation for the delay and later
submitted supplemental information in support of the request, but that information was
insufficient. Id. at 769, 40 P.3d at 127. The Court held that “the Commission abused its discretion
by awarding attorney fees to a claimant who had waived his right to recover attorney fees awarded
because he submitted his memorandum of costs and attorney fees months after the deadline.” Id.
at 769-70, 40 P.3d at 127-28.
In sum, the Board considered the information contained in Appellant’s three requests for
fees and costs, and the testimony Ms. Buentgen provided at the hearing. Appeal Exs. at 70-71.
Based on this information, the Board denied the request for attorney’s fees and costs. Id. at 71.
The Board recognized that it had discretion, acted within the bounds of such discretion, and
reached its decision by an exercise of reason after reviewing the information available in the
record. See id. at 70-71. The Board properly exercised its discretion when it denied Appellant’s
untimely request for attorney’s fees and costs because good cause was not shown. In fact, contrary
to Appellant’s assertions, if the Board had considered whether there was prejudice, it would have
ignored the legal standard set forth in Rule 741.02.d, which likely would have amounted to an
abuse of discretion. See Medrano, 136 Idaho at 769-70, 40 P.3d at 127-28.
The district court correctly held that “[Ms.] Buentgen admitted in declarations and at the
hearing that the failure to timely file for attorney fees was due to her error and misreading of the
rules. She detailed health issues, however, nothing specific over the seven month period at issue,
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which would have impacted her ability to timely request fees and costs. Instead the error was one
of misjudgment.” R. at 22.
The evidence, and lack thereof, presented in the record shows that reasonable minds would
find that Appellant did not meet the burden of showing good cause to explain the delay.
Accordingly, the district court’s decision should be affirmed.
D.

The Order was not arbitrary and capricious because it considered all the facts
and circumstances presented by Appellant.

An agency action is arbitrary if it was done without rational basis and in disregard of the
facts and circumstances presented or without adequate determining principles. A & B Irrigation
Dist., 153 Idaho at 511, 284 P.3d at 236 (citing Am. Lung Ass’n of Idaho/Nevada v. State, Dep’t
of Agric., 142 Idaho 544, 547, 130 P.3d 1082, 1085 (2006)). “Where there is room for two
opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration,
even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion has been reached.” Enterprise, Inc.
v Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 739, 536 P.2d 729, 734 (1975) (citations omitted).
The district court held that the Board Order was not arbitrary and capricious because it was
“based on the law, and the facts were rationally and properly applied to the law.” R. at 22. The
Board considered Appellant’s arguments made in the briefing and at the hearing—including that
“[counsel] is a solo practitioner without assistants, she had failed to read the rule properly and
calendar the date, and she believed that the request would be granted when she did make the
request.” Appeal Exs. at 70 ¶ 12. The Board also considered the general complaints from Ms.
Buentgen of fatigue and her health history from 2006 to 2017, as well as the fact that this
information did not address what prevented Ms. Buentgen from filing or seeking an extension of
time to file the request for fees and costs between May 2019 and December 2019. Id. at 70.
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As indicated in the Order, the Board’s decision was well-reasoned and the result of a review
of five prehearing briefs from Appellant and Board Staff, as well as testimony provided at the
hearing—including Ms. Buentgen’s opportunity to answer questions directed to her by the Board
at the hearing. It was not arbitrary and capricious for the Board to find that Ms. Buentgen did not
establish good cause in light of the facts and circumstances noted above. The Board determined
that the weight of the evidence presented by Appellant did not show good cause, and “[t]he court
shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions
of fact.” Idaho Code § 67-5279(1).
The Board considered all evidence presented by Appellant in the record and reached its
decision through due consideration. As discussed above in Section B, the Board was not required
to make a finding of prejudice as prejudice is not the analysis at issue. Though Appellant argues
that the Board failed to appreciate counsel’s ongoing health issues, the Board considered fully all
information and testimony presented at the time. If supplementary factual evidence existed to
demonstrate good cause existed between May 2019 and December 2019 to explain the untimely
filing, it was not presented to the Board. The Order was not arbitrary or capricious, and the lower
court’s decision should be affirmed.
E.

Appellant’s due process rights were not violated.

The first step to a due process challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a
protected property or liberty interest. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law[.]”); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). “To determine whether an individual’s due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment have been violated, courts must engage in a two-step analysis.” Guzman
v. Piercy, 155 Idaho 928, 939, 318 P.3d 918, 929 (2014). “The Court must first decide whether
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the individual’s threatened interest is a liberty or property interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the second step, the Court determines what process is due.” Id. (citations and
quotations marks omitted). To prevail, Appellant must demonstrate that the Board’s decision
deprived Appellant of a property interest and that it did not afford Appellant due process.
First, there is no property interest associated with an untimely request for attorney’s fees
and costs. “Property interests are not created by the Constitution, ‘they are created and their
dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source
such as state law. . . .’” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985) (quoting
Bd. of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)) (remaining citation omitted).
Though the initial award of fees and costs was contemplated by statute, there is no
requirement to grant a request for fees and costs once untimely. While Idaho Code section 541728(7) provides for the award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code section 12117(5), Idaho Code section 54-1720(8) states that “the [B]oard shall exercise all of its duties,
powers and authority in accordance with the [A]dministrative [P]rocedure [A]ct.” Accordingly,
any interest created by the statute is subject to the procedural requirements found in the Idaho
Rules of Administrative Procedure of the Attorney General (“APA”)—including filing deadlines.
The minimum time for filing for attorney’s fees and costs is found within the APA, and was 14
days. See Idaho Code § 67-5206 (stating that rules shall be promulgated to implement provisions);
see also IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02. While there may have been a property interest for a timely filing
of a request for attorney’s fees and costs, there exists no legitimate claim of entitlement to a
property interest where a request has been made untimely. See Medrano, 136 Idaho at 769-70, 40
P.3d at 127-28 (stating that claimant “waived his right to recover attorney fees awarded because
he submitted his memorandum of costs and attorney fees months after the deadline”).
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Further, discretionary decisions cannot form the basis of a protectable property interest.
See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (citation omitted) (stating
that “a benefit is not a protected entitlement if government officials may grant or deny it in their
discretion”). Here the Board’s decision to deny the untimely request for attorney’s fees and costs
was discretionary. See IDAPA 04.11.01.741.02.d (stating “the agency may exercise its discretion
to consider and grant an untimely filing for costs and/or fees for good cause shown”) (emphasis
added). Appellant must have “more than a unilateral expectation” of the benefit. See Scott v. Buhl
Jt. Sch. Dist. No. 412, 123 Idaho 779, 784, 852 P.2d 1376, 1381 (1993) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at
577). Here, Appellant only had a unilateral expectation of an award of attorney’s fees and costs
made six months after the deadline. Appellant has no property interest because Appellant failed
to timely file the request in accordance with the applicable laws and rules. The Board submits that
there is no property interest associated with an untimely filing for attorney’s fees.
Second, if a property interest did exist, the Board provided all required due process to
Appellant. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333 (citations omitted).
Appellant filed three prehearing briefs in which she had the opportunity to show that good cause
existed for the delay in filing the request, and also provided testimony and legal argument at the
hearing. Appeal Exs. at 19-23, 36-40, 52-68; see generally id. at 74-83 (Tr.). All were reviewed
by the Board. See id. at 71.
Appellant argues that Appellant’s due process was violated in the Board’s denial because
no evidence of prejudice was presented at the hearing. Appellant’s Br. at 19. However, prejudice
to the parties is the incorrect standard to be applied, as discussed above in Section B. Moreover,
the Board considered Appellant’s arguments that prejudice should be analyzed under the good
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cause analysis in her third response as well as during the hearing. Appeal Exs. at 52-68, 77 (Tr.
11:4-8), 81 (Tr. 28:3-29:11). Additionally, Board Staff responded to Appellant’s arguments
regarding prejudice in briefing and at the hearing. Id. at 41-51, 78 (Tr. 14:13-15:1), 78-79 (Tr.
17:14-21:20). Appellant also had the opportunity to respond to Board Staff’s arguments at the
hearing. Id. at 81 (Tr. 28:3-29:11). Evidence of Appellant’s arguments was presented at the
hearing and she had a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The fact that the Board properly
declined to analyze prejudice as it is the incorrect standard does not alter the fact that Appellant
was provided all due process rights.
Due process requires that an agency order must provide notice of the grounds on which the
agency relies for its determination. See Idaho Code § 67-5248. As discussed above, the Order
identified the prehearing briefings from Appellant and Board Staff, and noted the evidence in the
record it relied upon in making the decision. Appeal Exs. at 70. The Order also identified the
applicable time limits by the reference to Rule 741. Id. at 69-70. Additionally, the Board followed
the applicable requirements as set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code sections
67-5232 through 67-5279, and IDAPA 04.11.01. The Order complied with Idaho law and
provided all process required.
F.

The substantial rights of Appellant were not prejudiced.

A petitioner challenging an agency’s decision bears the burden of establishing that the
decision violates one of the grounds specified in Idaho Code section 67-5279(3). Wheeler, 147
Idaho at 260, 207 P.3d at 991. As discussed above, Appellant has failed to show that the Board’s
Order does not comply with Idaho Code section 67-5279(3).

“Regardless of whether the

[agency]’s action meets the standard set forth in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3), the district court must
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affirm the [agency]’s action ‘unless substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced.’” Id.
(quoting Idaho Code § 67-5279(4)).
Appellant argues that the Board deprived her of the “meaningful opportunity to present
evidence regarding the lack of prejudice to the agency.” Appellant’s Br. at 19-20. However, as
discussed above in Section B, there was no legal requirement to consider prejudice under a good
cause analysis. The Board applied the correct standard in its good cause analysis. The substantial
rights of Appellant have not been prejudiced.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The district court correctly held that the Board applied the correct standard in the Order,
and Appellant failed to show that good cause existed to justify the delay. The district court also
correctly held that a finding of prejudice is not required by Rule 741 in a good cause analysis. The
Board’s denial is supported by substantial evidence in the record, and was not arbitrary, capricious,
or an abuse of discretion. The Board’s denial of fees and costs was based on the facts and
circumstances presented in the record. Additionally, the denial does not prejudice Appellant’s
substantial or due process rights. Respondent respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
district court’s decision dismissing the Petition for Judicial Review.
DATED: July 12, 2021.
Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Alexandra Anne Breshears
ALEXANDRA ANNE BRESHEARS
Deputy Attorney General
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